Moral reasoning

This was an interesting piece I wrote in 2005 about two well-known politicians who had had an affair. The paper discusses whether the woman (Edwina Currie) was right to publicly discuss this.

In September 2002, Edwina Currie published her diaries, entitled “A Parliamentary Affair”. In this, she referred to a four year affair with a politician, known anomalously in the diaries as ‘B’, beginning in 1984. Extracts were serialised in The Times and it was revealed that the politician was in fact John Major, then a Conservative whip for Margaret Thatcher. He admitted the affair, but claimed his wife Norma had known of this and had forgiven him. The Times’ revelation was attacked by a number of former MPs including David Mellor, who described the newspaper of “Behaving like a sleazy red-top tabloid” (BBC News 2002).

The paper, the moral agents in this case, claimed that they were entitled to expose the identity without permission on the grounds that (1) it was in the public’s interest to know due to Major’s status and (2) that it exposed hypocrisy and governmental secrecy.

A few years before Currie’s diaries were published, Major had written an autobiography but no mention of her was made. It is claimed by the media that Currie was hurt at this and the revelations were an act of revenge, though she categorically denied this.

This, along with other factors, raises the ethical dilemmas of: (1) Does John Major’s right to privacy outweigh the secrecy of the affair? (2) Do the revelations give further publicity to Currie’s book? (3) Would the revelations have destroyed Major’s career if revealed in the 1980s and is there a possible detrimental effect to the Conservative Party now?

The principles underlining the case are the duty to act responsibly and tell the truth and expose a revelation kept secret during Major’s key time as a Prime Minister. Yet with this comes a moral expectation to act responsibly, respecting an individual’s right to privacy. Plagued by sleaze and ministerial affairs, Major was determined that government misdemeanours, damaging his party’s reputation, would not be exposed. Known for his strong morals and ‘Back to Basics’ campaign, stressing the importance of family, no details of the affair were known during this time.

Currie’s references to Major as ‘B’ suggest that, while making public the details of the affair, her intentions were for the respect of the individual’s right to privacy. Some may suggest this a bound duty rather than a choice. Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights states “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life” (Welsh and Greenwood 2002, Essential Law for journalists, p.388). Although the defence that the paper acted to serve the public interest can be argued either way and it is true that, as an ex Prime Minster, the public are likely to take notice, the extent of this however, is questionable. His election defeat was six years ago and as such the details arguably have less of an impact. Had the story broke during the ‘back to basics’ years, perhaps the hypocrisy of Major’s beliefs may have had a larger consequence upon him. As a more recent materialisation, it has been described as having “an element of prurience” (Andrew Marr 2002, BBC News), yet lacking contemporary relevance.

Currie’s apparent respect for the right to privacy contradicts the claimed revenge motive. If she desired to shame Major, she may have named him in the publication. Furthermore, it would appear that an element of governmental secrecy in the diary remains, as though we can speculate, with no details of the affair known, no evidence would be available to prove Major’s guilt. It could be argued therefore that there is a moral dilemma for The Times of Currie’s apparent wishes and the role of acting for the public interest by “exposing…a serious misdemeanour” (Barendt and Hitchens 2000, Media Law cases and materials, cited Press Complaints Commission Public Interest Defence p, p.405). Indeed, it could be said Major had a duty as a Prime Minister to be honest with society and, through his deception, to his conscience to admit his act. This would conflict with, as Essential law states, the idea that “People in the public eye and their family…do not forfeit their rights to privacy” (Welsh and Greenwood 2002, McNae’s Essential Law for journalists, p.395).

With his rise in politics into an emerging candidate for party leadership at the time the diaries were written, one could suggest that the details, had they been released by the media or Currie at this time, could have caused catastrophic damage to his reputation, perhaps tarnishing his political career altogether. Had they been released at the time he was Prime Minister, the reputation of the Conservative Party could have been seriously damaged. With Major no longer Prime Minister however, the extent of the consequences may be far less severe.

Nevertheless, the timing of the news could still be regarded as being inappropriate. With the Conservative Party Conference taking place at the time details of the affair emerged, further exposure of the story dominated many newspapers, with the discussions in Bournemouth, one may feel, disregarded. Here, The Times could be criticised, since the issues discussed had less publicity than may have been given had the reports not coincided with the conference.

In addition, it can be argued that the newspaper was unethical in exposing Major through the risk of damaging his marriage and has a duty to respect this. Although forgiven, and a seemingly difficult period for the marriage during the 1980s now overlooked, it is possible that bringing the information into public knowledge may have caused distress to the Majors. However, one could just as argue that if this were the case, their marriage may have ceased when he confessed to his wife.

Perhaps the main criticism of The Times’ actions is the breach of confidence. It is unlikely that Major was informed of the decision to name him and therefore if this is the case, no injunction could be sought against “what I have feared would come to light for a long time” (BBC news 2002, cited Major 2002). However, The Times have a defence for the truth and therefore it is unlikely an injunction would have been granted.

Despite this, The Times still have a moral duty to both the public, the law, and, in this case, the individual, to produce reliable and accurate information. As Frost writes:
If the information is known by the journalist to be totally accurate, then there is no problem… But, when the information comes from another source that is not so reliable, the journalist has to make an assessment about whether to pass this information on to the consumer (Frost 2002, Media Ethics and Self-regulation, p.30)
Though Major admitted to the affair, The Times, when naming Major, had only Currie’s word. Therefore, it could be argued a discussion should have been held between the newspaper and him.


The idea of an individual ethically bound to a duty, known as the categorical imperative, results from the deontological theories of studies that place:
An emphasis on acting on principle or according to certain moral duties without regard of their actions (Day, Ethics and Mass Communications Studies, p.59).
In the case of The Times, it could be believed that beneath the possible justification to tell the truth laid the duty to eradicate the mystery behind the duty and avoid speculation that may have falsely accused other individuals. As much as Kant (1724-1804) disregards the consequences, it is this that may justify:
Living up to standards because they are good, not because of the consequences that may result (Day, Ethics and Mass Communication Studies, p.57).

Yet there is conflict in his own argument. He emphasises the need to act to tell the truth, yet believes “One has a duty to tell the truth, even if it might result in harm to others” (Day, Ethics and Mass Communication Studies, p.57). As Day suggests:
The reason that the duty to tell the truth is such a fundamental principle is that truth telling produces good consequences for society (Day, Ethics and Mass Communication Studies, p.60). Furthermore, Besley says:
A democratic society…requires freedom of information…and this gives the press its vital role (Belsey and Chadwick 1992, Ethical issues in journalism and the media, p.90).
Therefore, perhaps The Times are justified in naming Major, as it can be thought that drawing attention to government misdemeanour benefits society by ensuring that politicians act responsibly. The idea of ‘serving a greater good’, in addition, as Plato believed, means “An individual would be justified in defying conventional wisdom”(Day, Ethics and Mass Communications Studies, p.56). The Times then could perhaps defy the wishes of Major and identify him through using these grounds for defence. However, can damaging a good reputation be regarded as ‘good’ ethical conduct?

When revealing Major as Currie’s lover, the teleological theories, concerned with “The consequences of an ethical argument” (Day, Ethics and Mass Communications Studies, p.57). Rather than attempting to justify a possibly unethical practice, the utilitarian theorists deem that practices should “Promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people”. This therefore disregards somewhat Major’s view of the diaries if public interest exists, although had the details been published during his Prime Ministerial years, the sole benefit in politics would most likely have been the Labour party, since the Conservatives would most likely have needed to build an already crumbling public image. Yet while public interest in may have existed last September, the consequences for Iain Duncan-Smith were evident. His party were in turmoil, with party loyalties split and public confidence in them low. Therefore, with the publicity that surrounded the revelations, despite Duncan-Smith’s desire for the story not to overshadow the conference, one could suggest this was unfair. The Conservatives of today were not involved in the scandal, so why should negative publicity be stowed upon them? As Day writes:
On balance, the consequences for the public might be greater than the harm to the subject of the story, but the reporter has a moral obligation to inflict only the harm required to put the story into perspective. To do more would only appeal more to the morbid curiosity of the public (Day, Ethics and Communication Studies, p.61).

Maybe one should consider the possible motive of increased media publicity for Currie’s book. The Times even remarked:
The focus on one particularly relevant fact…has naturally distracted attention…These diaries are far from great literature, but they are an accessible part of a life in politics…Readers who have purchased The Times today solely for salacious detail are likely to be disappointed (Guardian 2002, cited The Times).
However, Currie is now a host of a late night radio programme on Five Live. One could argue that this position was as a result of the media attention to the affair, perhaps with the BBC keen to bring a controversial figure in. If this is true, and furthermore, if Currie received additional money for the disclosure, this diverts from the theory of Judeo-Christianity. Under this theory:
All moral decisions should be based on a respect for the dignity of persons as an end in itself rather than merely a means to an end (Day, Ethics and Mass Communications Studies, p.56).
Therefore, if there was a financial incentive for Currie, this could be regarded as being a highly unethical practice by The Times.

The idea of public access to the diary in itself contradicts the confidential nature of a diary. Further to this, there is a strong case that through the increased media attention to her book, this more benefited Currie in terms of book sales than the public, particularly when it has far less relevance today than it would had if it had led to the downfall of Major.

While the theories may disagree in parts, Day believes “They have one thing in common: they are concerned with standards and principles” (Day, Ethics and Mass Communications Studies, p.62). Aristotle (384-322 B.C) though in the idea of a golden mean, a negotiated virtue. In the case of The Times, the decision concerns the virtues of truth against privacy, and in Major’s case, hypocrisy versus reputation. So with the issue of his privacy, one could argue such a decision like that of the Times brings with it the danger of further questions being asked of the individual. If this is true, then since Major admitted the affair, the possible unfair media harassment that may follow would perhaps cause negative consequences such as stress to Major. However, Major led the public to believe a policy he seemingly has fully behind, yet did not adhere to himself. The question here is whether, for the sake of his conscience, Major should have owned up and risked prime ministerial ruin or maintained the stability of the nation’s leadership.

Based on the evidence, my decision would be reveal the news, though breaking the revelation after the Conservative Party Conference, allowing it the coverage it morally should be granted, rather than being overshadowed. However, this would bring the relevance into further doubt, since the book will be less recent. All the same, The Times have a public interest and newsworthiness defence that, while not as strong as it would have been during Major’s political career, could still be argued, with the damage caused furthermore less. Major’s act was a misdemeanour, his ‘Back to basics’ policy therefore perhaps insincere. With a high profile individual with an ethical duty to society to perform his task of leading government in an honest fashion, it is therefore necessary for society to be informed.

Where the justification for exposing Major is questionable though is where Major’s admission is concerned. Whilst it prevented a possible media frenzy of speculation, it instead resulted in an amount of coverage that was perhaps unnecessary. Belsey (Ethical issues in journalism and the media 1992, p.90) however perhaps makes the strongest defence for the newspaper:
The British Press is already too restricted by the laws of official secrets, libel and contempt of court. To add privacy to that list would be to invite further misuse of the law by public figures with something to hide.